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Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient?  












The efficiency of market-determined risk classification in automobile insurance is a lasting 
matter of controversy. It can be traced back to the 1950s (Muir, 1957) and received broad 
economic attention in the 1980s when spiralling car insurance premiums in the US were 
blamed on tariff regulations prohibiting the use of sex, age and location as risk characteristics 
(Blackmon/ Zeckhauser 1991, Cummins/ Tennyson 1992, Harrington/ Doerpinghaus 1993). 
In a mirroring move the EU saw a heated political and legal debate on the use of special 
tariffs for foreigners, in the 1980s, which resulted in a legal ban of ‘discriminatory’ tariffs for 
mandatory insurance schemes in many European countries
4. The latest blow against risk 
classification in car insurance comes with the EU Employment and Social Affairs’ draft 
directive on gender equality
5 which proposes to prohibit gender specific calculation of all 
private insurance products, including non-mandatory branches such as life, private health or 
comprehensive car insurance. 
 
There is a great body of economic literature, often from fields unrelated to insurance, that 
looks into the efficiency of market-determined risk classification. The general result of this 
literature is that efficient low cost information on risk will be selected by the market, but there 
can be excessive classification with costly information (Hoy 1982, 1988, Crocker/ Snow 
1986, 2000). Arbitrary or superfluous information will generally not be selected by the market 
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(Harrington/ Doerpinghaus 1993). These results are derived for an unregulated market in 
which consumers are free to buy their preferred amount of coverage. There is only limited 
literature that deals with risk classification in mandatory insurance markets, this literature 
arrives at somewhat more sceptical results. Hoy (1984, 562) shows that risk discrimination 
becomes purely re-distributive under a mandated offer of the ‘same policy for everyone’. 
Polborn (1997, 31 ff) proves that risk classification in such settings may distort consumption 
behaviour, and Buzzachi/ Valetti (2002) demonstrate that it could be used by oligopolistic 
firms for the purpose of strategic pricing. 
 
This paper studies the empirical effect of risk classification in the mandatory third-party 
motor insurance (TPMI) of Germany. We find evidence that inefficient risk categories had 
been selected in this market while potentially efficient information may have been dismissed. 
Risk classification did generally not improve the efficiency of contracting or the composition 
of insureds in this market. These findings can be partly explained by the existence of 
compulsory fixed coverage and other institutional restraints such as unitary owner insurance 
in this market. 
 
The paper breaks into seven sections. In section two, we review the efficiency effects of risk 
classification and demonstrate it’s complementary with a bonus-malus system of (partial) 
experience rating. In section three, we give a brief historic overview on risk classification in 
German TPMI and discuss the patterns of diffusion of the ‘new’ risk characteristics, which 
followed the EU directive on non-life insurance of 1994. In section four, we study the 
empirical effects of applying these new risk determinants on firm performance. Our study is 
based on observations of changes in firm-specific loss ratios in the period 1995-1997. In 
section five, we complement our findings by looking at aggregate effects in the TPMI market. 
Specifically, we discuss longer-term price trends and trends in traffic-related damages as 
ancillary evidence for the missing efficacy of the newly introduced tariff items. In section six, 
we provide new evidence that prior traffic violations (demerit points) are a powerful predictor 
of future accidents and discuss why this risk determinant has not been applied in Germany. 
Section seven summarises our results and discusses the implications of our findings for the 
current political debate in the EU. 
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2. The Efficiency Effects of Risk Classification 
 
While the public policy debate on risk classification mainly focuses on the equity dimension
6, 
economists are more concerned with its effects on efficiency. Their basic argument, in favour 
of risk categorisation, is that the problem of adverse selection may arise if firms are unable to 
distinguish between different types of risks but clients can, ie if asymmetric information 
persists. Adverse selection implies that high-risk types are able to purchase coverage at a 
premium below their expected damage. As a result firms earn a loss on each such contract. 
Adverse selection also implies that pooled contracts with low and high risks will be driven out 
of the market as a result of lacking demand of low-risks and competitive pressures from other 
firms. The lacking demand problem is described in a seminal paper of Akerlof, (1970). Low-
risk insureds increasingly strive for self-insurance as the price of insurance approaches the 
actuarial fair premium of high risks in a process of adverse selection. Another force for 
classifying risks is competition. Any insurer offering a contract that pools low and high risks 
will face a competing contract from other insurers aimed to attract the low risks from its pool. 
The reason is that such ‘cream skimming’ behaviour creates an information rent for the 
innovative firm. While temporary by nature (because the attacked firm will respond 
accordingly) these rents provide a constant motive to search for risk characteristics that help 
identify better than average risks in any incompletely separated market. 
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz, (1976) have demonstrated that a set of separating contracts can 
equilibrate adverse selection markets, provided the share of high risks in the pool of insureds 
is above a critical level. This ‘separating equilibrium’ is characterised by differential coverage 
for high-risk consumers and low-risk clients. High risk consumers receive complete coverage 
while low risk consumers have less than full coverage. Both are priced at their respective 
actuarial fair premium. This solution, which has since been refined as an equilibrium concept 
(eg Wilson, 1977), is characterised by a rationing of low-risk clients. The efficiency of risk 
classification immediately follows from this negative externality. Improved information on 
the part of the insurer allows to ease the rationing of low-risk insureds. With perfect 
discrimination all insureds receive desired complete coverage at actuarial fair premiums. This 
possibility of Pareto-improving information is noted in Rothschild and Stiglitz, (1976, 638). It 
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has been studied in-depth for various types of costly imperfect information by Hoy, (1982, 
1988), and Crocker and Snow, (1986, 2000). 
 
This efficiency gain from risk classification only arises if the quantity of insurance coverage 
is a choice variable of customers. If insureds are mandated to buy a fixed amount of coverage 
– say: unlimited coverage –, classifying risks will by definition not affect the ‘chosen’ rate of 
coverage. While pricing high risk consumers a higher price decreases the rate of cross-
subsidisation inherent to any mandatory scheme of insurance, it does not change the 
behaviour of insureds or, more specifically, their decision to co-insure. The effect of risk 
classification will be purely re-distributive. In other words: it may improve the equity but not 
the efficiency of mandatory insurance. 
 
A different efficiency enhancing effect of risk classification follows from the improved 
composition of low- to high-risk insureds in the population of drivers. A simple graphical 
illustration of the effect is given in figure 1 (an analogous illustration is provided in Rea, 
1992). We consider two types of customers: low-risk drivers (L) and high-risk drivers (H). 
High-risk drivers exhibit a larger willingness-to-pay for coverage (D
H) than low-risk-drivers 
(D
L), because of greater risk exposure. In a perfectly separated market, low-risk drivers would 
pay a premium equal to their expected loss per period of P
L and the number of insureds would 
amount to L*. Similarly, high-risk drivers would pay a premium of P
H and their number 
would be H*. If risk classification is restricted so that both types of customers pay the same 
rate (P1), the number of low-risk drivers will decline to L1 while the number of drivers in the 
high-risk segment will increase to H1. Because of this changing proportion of high- to low-
risk drivers the average cost of coverage increases to P2. Consequently, insurers have to 
increase the average premium to avoid loss. With P2 being the ultimate equilibrium price, the 
benefits of risk classification to low-risk drivers (b) exceeds the costs to high-risk-drivers (a) - 
mainly because the average price of insurance decreases from P2 to P1.  The move from the 
pooled equilibrium (L2, H2) to the separated equilibrium (L*, H*) is welfare improving 
because the reduction in social cost of a decreasing number of high-risk drivers surmounts 
their willingness-to-pay by the shaded area c. The simultaneous increase of low-risk drivers in 
the pool is socially beneficial because their willingness to pay exceeds their expected accident 
costs by the shaded area b. The sum of b and c marks the social welfare enhancement from 
(costless) risk classification (Rea, 1992). It is due to an improved composition of insureds. 
     7
Figure 1: Efficiency of Risk Classification 
 
The previous reasoning only considers the problem of adverse selection. But the problem of 
adverse selection may carry over to a problem of moral hazard. If insurance premiums are not 
reflecting expected damages the insureds level of activity, and their incentives for care, will 
also be distorted. High-risk types paying a too low premium will simply drive too much or act 
too careless while low-risk types will be overcautious or too reluctant to drive given a 
comparatively too high premium. 
 
An institutionally important spill-over of this sort is the impact of risk classification on the 
incentives to take care under a ‘bonus-malus system’ (BMS). A BMS is a scheme of premium 
surcharges and rebates based on accident occurrence. BMS are widely used in OECD 
countries to control traffic related moral hazards
7. Essentially, a BMS is a partial system of 
experience rating because it is based on the probability (occurrence) but not the severity of 
accidents (damage). The simplified example in table 1 demonstrates how a system of 
unclassified (ie pooled fair) premiums (π) translates into inefficient incentives to take care 
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Table 1: Moral Hazard Effect of a Uniform Premium in a BMS Setting 
 
H-Type L-Type 
Expected damage (EDH): 0.1 
(1000)=100 
Expected Damage (EDL): 0.05 (800) = 
40 
Pooled fair premium (πH = πL = π): 70  Pooled fair premium (π): 70 
20% malus, unclassified: ∆ π = 14  20% malus, unclassified: ∆ π = 14 
20% malus, risk classified: ∆ EDH = 20  20% malus, risk classified: ∆ EDL = 8 
 
Let the expected damage of high-risk insureds be 100 resulting from a 10 per-cent chance of 
an accident with an average damage of 1000. The expected damage of low- risk types is set at 
40 resulting from an accident probability of 5 per-cent and an average damage of 800. The 
pooled fair premium is 70 accordingly. If a malus of 20 per-cent reflects the average increase 
in accident probability (partial BMS) conditional upon an observed occurrence it would lead 
to a unitary surcharge of 14 for both risk types. This surcharge gives too little weight to the 
damage proneness of high-risk types. Consequently the incentives to take care are too low for 
high risk types (H-Types) and too high for low risks types (L-Types) under a pooled fair 
premium (π) as compared to risk-differentiated premiums (EDi, i=L, H). 
 
In summary, there are three separable efficiency effects from classifying risks according to 
their type. The first is improved efficiency in contracting. Risk classification enables low-risk 
consumers to buy desired full coverage in a Rothschild-Stiglitz-type adverse selection market. 
Importantly, this gain does not accrue in a mandatory fixed coverage scheme of insurance. 
The second gain is an improved composition of insureds in the pool. Risk classification 
increases the number of low risk drivers compared to the number of high risk drivers in the 
pool. This effect can also be seen in a fully regulated market. It appears in a decreasing 
average price of insurance. The third economic gain of risk classification is associated with 
moral hazard. Risk-classified tariffs incite efficient adjustments in drivers’ risk behaviour and 
provide an important weighting for a BMS-type partial scheme of experience rating. This 
effect results in decreasing traffic-related damages across all firms, including those firms with 
a non-improving or deteriorating composition of insureds. 
 
 
3. Risk Classification in German Third Party Motor Insurance 
 
The politics of risk classification in the German TPMI can be broadly divided into two 
periods. The ‘old’ system of risk characteristics started with the introduction of compulsory    9
TPMI in 1942. The risk characteristics which were then stipulated, by the national regulatory 
board for insurance, were mainly commercial usage and motor power. This selection of risk 
determinants was based on the perception that traffic risks are influenced by the inherent 
dangerousness of the ‘machine’ or the activity. In 1962 an accident-based BMS was 
introduced. This was the first major move towards a driver-related system of risk 
classification. The 1960s also saw a shift towards locational and occupation-based tariffs. 
Paradoxically, it was the mutual insurance companies whose regional and professional ties 
triggered this move. Major institutional changes came with the EU’s third non-life insurance 
directive of 1994. It brought about a complete de-regulation of the insurance market; firms are 
since free to choose their risk rates. Many, though, base their rating on voluntary, non-binding 
risk tables produced at the German insurance association (GDV) in practice. While the EU 
directive paved the way for firm-specific risk selection it did not change the basic mandatory 
nature of German TPMI, including the duty to contract for insurers. The immediate effect of 
the EU directive has been a ten-year period of experimenting with new risk characteristics, 
and another notable focus shift from non-driver to driver-related characteristics such as 
driver’s age and sex. 
 
Table 2, see pages 6-7, depicts the diffusion of the new risk characteristics in Germany after 
de-regulation in 1994. The entries in table 2 relate different types of rebates and surcharges to 
the rate of market penetration (expressed as percentage of companies which applied these 
variables) at different years. ‘N’ indicates the number of observed insurance companies in 
each year. The risk characteristics are reported for the motor insurance market as a whole 
because separate data on risk variables for different classes of insurance (eg TPMI, 
comprehensive insurance) were not available. During the first three years (1995- 1997) nearly 
all German insurers reported to Finanztest. In subsequent years less information was available 
because of non-response by some firms. 
 
Looking into the present system of rebates/ surcharges (2003), we find that Car Age, Driver 
Age, Mileage, Occupation and Garage Ownership are the most common risk variables. Other 
variables like Children and Long-term Client are used by nearly half the firms. Yet other 
variables such as Rebates for Safe Driving Practice and Fuel Saving Cars are supplied by few 
firms.  
 
We may distinguish between four basic patterns of diffusion (see figure 2).    10
Figure 2: Patterns of Diffusion  
 
•  ‘Successful’: The market penetration increases rapidly after introduction; it slows 
down in approaching complete diffusion (ie 100 per-cent market penetration). 
•  ‘Delayed’: The market penetration increases over a long period of time (say: a decade) 
at a low rate; it eventually approaches the 100 per-cent-level at some time. 
•  ‘Unsuccessful’: The market penetration increases rapidly at first; it reaches its 
maximum well below the 100 per-cent level (say: 30 per-cent) and decreases to zero 
thereafter. 
•  ‘Niche’: The market penetration remains low but constant over a long period of time 
(say: a decade). 
 
From table 2, we take that Car Age, Mileage, Garage/ House-Ownership, Driver Age and 
Occupation exhibit a normal diffusion curve of firstly accelerated and consequently 
decelerated market penetration, which we call ‘successful’. Single Driver, Women, Children, 
Non-Owner Driver and Long-term client bonus show a ‘delayed’ pattern of diffusion, ie they 
are still in an acceleration stage. It cannot be said whether these risk characteristics achieve 
complete market penetration in the future (dotted line) or not. Fuel savers, Oldtimer, Rebates 
for Disabled and Surcharges for High Power Cars are ‘niche’ strategies pursued by few 
specialised insurers; the market penetration of these characteristics is constantly low. Rebates 
for Safe Driving Practice and Experienced Drivers (Age > 25), or surcharges for specific 


















1997 1999 2001 2003
Market
Penetration 
[%]   11






















8 69,8  72,4  Car Age (New 
Cars or First Hand 
Owner)  1,0
9 0,9  12,6 
95,5 96,3 97,5 96,9 96 
Mileage (usually < 
9.000 km/a) 
3,1  34,9  64,8  85,2 86,6 90  90,6 96 
Garage  3,1  34,0  65,7  89,8 86,6 95  93,8 96 
1,0
10 6,6  23,8  Restricted Usage 
4,2
11 4,7  35,2 
45,5 41,5 35  50  48 
Sex
12  4,2  22,6  21,9  23,9 12,2 16,2 20,3 42 
Driver Age
13 (25 – 
65) 
-    -  26,1 52,4 67,5    
Occupation
14  39,6   -  47,7 73,2 83,8 81,3 86 
Children
15      -  23,9 25,6 25  42,2 42 
Long-term Client




-    -  11,4 17,1 12,5 9,4  8 
Fuel Saving Car  1,0 1,9  3,8  -  1,2 2,5 3,1 2 




Cars age 7 years 
and older) 
9,4  49,1  56,2  95,5 96,3 97,5 96,9 96 
Mileage (usually > 
30.000 km/a) 
2,1  7,5  31,4  85,2 86,6 90  90,6 96 
Driver Age ( < mid 
20) 




-   -  - 17,1  18,8  26,6  18 




-   -  - - 5 3,1  - 
                                                 
8 New car. 
9 First hand owner. 
10 Single rebate. 
11 Partner rebate. 
12 Rebate for single female drivers. 
13 Rebate for driver aged 25 or older. In 2002 such rebates were withdrawn in favour of surcharges for young 
drivers 
 (< 25), see below. 
14 Rebates for members of certain occupations such as policemen, civil servants, clerics etc. 
15 Owner with young children (below 15 years old). 
16 Rebate for long-term clients or bundled home insurance contracts. 
17 Rebate for successful participants in the federal traffic safety education programme. 
18 Frequent driving outside Germany.    12
High Power Cars  -   -  - 3,7  3,8  4,7  - 




     -  7,3 12,5  18,8  6 
Married       4,5 -  1,3 1,6 4 
Public Transport 
Subscribers 




     - 1,2  5 6,3  8 
Oldtimer       - 24,4  20  32,8  - 
 
Source: Finanztest 3/ 1995, Finanztest 5/ 1997, Finanztest 10/ 1999, Finanztest 11/ 2000, 
Finanztest 11/ 2001, Finanztest 11/ 2002, Finanztest 12/ 2003. 
In summary we find that German insurers have used their ‘new freedom of pricing’ 
intensively to experiment with new types of risk classifications. Few were successful while 
some seem to be still in the process of diffusion. Others have been used but were withdrawn 
after a few years. The rapid speed of the diffusion of successful risk characteristics in the first 
three years after de-regulation (1995-1997) indicate a strong pressure to imitate innovative 
behaviour. 
 
A risk determinant of peculiar interest is Garage Ownership. Consumer associations have 
marked it ‘irrelevant’ and potentially ‘discriminatory’ (BDV 2001, 3). Indeed, there is no 
obvious reason why garage owners would cause fewer traffic accidents than non-owners. 
There is no direct causal relationship between garage ownership and cautious driving. But 
perhaps there is a third, as yet unknown criterion, (eg, a caring attitude towards the car) which 
could explain a positive correlation. Similarly, the current trend of bundling insurance 
products could be either anti-competitive (eg, a cross-subsidisation for home insurance at the 
expense of the community of compulsorily insured car owners) or it could indicate a yet 
unknown indirect connection between house-ownership and safe driving. 
 
4. The Effect of New Risk Characteristics on Firm Performance 
 
In order to test if risk classification creates information rents for innovative firms we studied 
the effect of applying the new risk characteristics on firm-specific loss ratios. The loss ratio in 
t (LRt) is defined as the sum of claims over the sum of premiums in period t: 
 
                                                 
19 Premium adders for drivers in Berlin according to selected post-code districts, or ‘New Länder’ tariffs. 
20 Rebate for combined comprehensive coverage or surcharge for missing combined comprehensive coverage.    13
LRt = Sum of Claimst / Sum of Gross Premiumst * 100. 
 
The variation in the loss ratio (VRT) measures the percentage change of the loss ratio in two 
successive years:  
 
VRT = [LRt+1 - LRt]/ LRt * 100. 
 
The expected sign of variation rate depends on several conditions which will be presented in 
the following: 
 
An insurer which introduces a rebate for ‘good risks’ as first mover faces two offsetting 
economic effects. Its own ‘good risks’ will have to pay less premiums; consequently his 
premium revenues are decreasing compared to before (-∆P). On the other hand, he will attract 
new ‘good risks’ so that additional premium revenues arise (+P
N) jointly with additional 
damage payments for this group (+L











To decide about the expected sign of the variation rate VRT it is necessary to compare LRt and 
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A negative variation rate can be expected if either L
N is small or P
N - ∆P is high. A small L
N 
may be the result of successfully attracting ‘good risks’, which is the center aim of this 
strategy. A large difference between P
N and ∆P can be the result of two different effects. On 
the one hand, the additional premium income P
N from new risks can be substantial.    14
Alternatively, the premium revenue losses ∆P resulting from giving rebates to existing policy 
holders could be small. It is reasonable to expect that a rebate which is only offered by one 
firm or few firms (‘first movers’) can be small to attract ‘good risks’. It is also reasonable to 
expect that additional premium earnings (P
N) for first movers will be high while premium 
revenue losses (∆P) will be low. Hence, a negative variation rate can be expected if rebates 
are given as part of a strategy of ‘innovative competition’. 
 
Introducing a rebate in response to past innovative behaviour of other firms (‘imitative 
competition’) aims to prevent the loss of ‘good risks’ from an existing pool to competitors 
which are offering this rebate. The imitative strategy faces the problem that damages remain 










Hence, the denominator decreases and LRt+1 increases. The variation rate VRT is positive with 
certainty. In other words: a strategy of imitative competition based on rebates leads to an 
increase of the loss ratio. 
 
Innovators which are using surcharges create incentives for ‘bad risks’ to leave their pool. 
Consequently damages from this segment decrease (-L
M) at these firms. Premium revenues 
from this subgroup too decreases (-P
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Following this, we expect a negative variation rate for innovative surcharges, if the loss ratio 
of the leaving policy holders is higher than the average loss ratio in the pre-existing pool; in 
other words: if comparatively ‘bad risks’ leave the pool, which is the aim of this strategy. 
Assuming that surcharges are an appropriate way to achieve this effect, this inequality is 
given and we expect a negative variation rate as a result of innovative competition based on 
surcharges. 
 
If an insurer introduces surcharges as a consequence of the behavior of other firms (‘imitative 
competition’) he aims to prevent ‘bad risks’ from entering his firm. Given that this defence 










from which follows that the variation rate of loss ratio at best remains constant in the case of 
surcharge-based ‘imitative competition’. 
 
An negative VRT can be seen as an information rent of insurance firms since the improved 
cost structure (decreasing sum of claims) is not fully passed through to the consumer 
(decreasing gross premiums). Based on our previous reasoning we assume that information 
rents accrue to innovators but not to imitators, since innovators face a better chance of 
attracting ‘good risks’ by targeted rebates. They also have a greater chance to shift ‘bad risks’ 
to other firms by targeted surcharges. Accordingly we classify a risk determinant as 
innovative (imitative) if less than 50 per-cent (more than 50 per-cent) of the market did apply 
it. Table 3 depicts the results of this classification for the study period 1995 to 1997. 
 
Table 3: Innovative and Imitative Competition in Germany 
 
  1995 1996 1997 
Age of car  Innovative (N)  Imitative (M)  Imitative (M) 
Mileage   Innovative (N)  Innovative (N)  Imitative (M) 
Restricted Usage (female-,  
single-, partner rebate) 
Innovative (N)  Innovative (N)  Innovative (N) 
Special rebates or premium 
adders  (rebates for fuel 
saving cars, special rating 
systems) 
Innovative (N)  Innovative (N)  Innovative (N) 
Garage rebate  Innovative (N)  Innovative (N)  Imitative (M)    16
We expect a negative VRT as a result of using Age of Car as a risk determinant only in 1995 
because in subsequent years this risk characteristic was adopted by more than 50 per-cent of 
the firms. Similarly, we expect the Mileage Per Year and the Garage Holding to improve the 
loss ratio in 1995 and 1996 before these risk factors became wide spread in 1997. Rebates for 
Female, Single, and Partner Drivers, which we grouped ‘Restricted Usage’, were innovative 
throughout the whole study period; so were a group of special rebates and premium adders 
such as rebates for Fuel Saving Cars and surcharges for Frequently Driving Outside Germany. 
Special attention is given to the Garage Rebate because many critics focus on this ‘counter-
intuitive’ risk determinant (eg BDV 2001, 3). 
 
We applied an ordinary least square regression to control for other factors that affect the loss 
ratio such as field service, local operation, or restricted supply to special groups of insureds 
(eg members of professions): 
 
 
VRT = ß0 + ß1Nt + ß2Nt-1 … ß3Mt + ß4Mt-1 + ß6Service + ß7 Local + ß8 Personal + ε 
 
with:    
ßi= regression co-efficients,  
ε = error term,  
Nt = innovative risk characteristic (applied < 50 per-cent of all firms),   
Mt = imitative risk characteristic (applied > 50 per-cent of all firms),  
Service = own field service (0,1),  
Local = locally restricted supply (0,1),  
Personal = group specific supply, eg only clerics (0,1) Data on the firm-specific usage of new 
rebates and additional premiums were taken from the data set ‘Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Market’ (Wein, 2001); firm-specific loss ratios are from Tillinghast Towers Perrin (2001).   
 
The descriptive values of VRT in this data set are depicted in table 4. 
    17
Table 4: Variation Rate of Loss Ratios - Data Set: Motor Vehicle Insurance Market 
 
   91/92 92/93 93/94  94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99
Mean:  5.474 -3.049 -10.08 -2.562 1.521 2.975 5.303 6.936
Median:  3.737 -1.314 -8.829 -2.099 0.860 4.174 5.755 1.963
Minimum:  -17.61 -57.07 -29.44 -29.76 -51.77 -44.32 -8758 -30.56
Maximum:  187.4 22.41 4.41  46.51 55.67 43.11 7367 538.3
Standard deviation: 
% 
19.14 9.994 5.824  9.633 12.21 12.129  17.69 52.46
N:   107  109 110 111 112 115  111  109 
 
The results from the OLS regression are provided in table 5 and table 6.  
 
 
Table 5: Firm-Level Effects (same year)
21 
 


















Mileage rebates or surcharge in 1995
N / 1996
N / 1997








Restricted usage rebates in 1995
N / 1996
N / 1997



















Garage rebate in 1995
N / 1996
N / 1997































2 (adjusted)  0.068 0.015  0.069 






N:  87 95  97 




















                                                 
21  OLS-estimation; significant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, ** and ***; t-values in parentheses. 
22 Hoa: null hypothesis could be rejected, Hona: null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses.    18
 
Model 1 analyses the effects of new tariff items used at the beginning of 1995 on the loss 
ratios of 1995, model 2 estimates the influence of risk determinants used in 1996 on the loss 
ratio in the same year, while model 3 looks at the same-year effects of tariff items used in 
1997. 
 
Table 5 shows that only a few new characteristics did significantly influence the profitability 
of firms such as Age of Car, Mileage and Special Rebates (shaded in table 5). These variables 
show the expected signs, ie a decline of the loss ratio after the risk factor was introduced. 
They also conform to our expectation by showing a positive sign if they were introduced as 
part of an imitative strategy. Interestingly, the Garage Rebate has no significant effect on the 
loss ratio in any year. The general pictures that emerges from this analysis is that some risk 
determinants did provide information rents to innovators while other factors seems to be ill-
taken (such as the Garage Rebate). Information rents were generally restricted to the first in 





                                                                                                                                                          
23 Heteroskedastie-consistent-OLS-Estimation after White. Data set ‘motor vehicle insurance market’; estimated 
with EViews 4.0.    19
Table 6: Firm-Level Effects (lagged)
24 
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2 (adjusted)  0,053 0,043 -0,045 






N:  87 90 86 





















The lagged models in table 6 demonstrate that these rents were principally temporary. Model 
4 displays the effect of risk variables introduced in 1995 in the year 1996, model 5 the effects 
of risk variables in 1995 in the year 1997, and model 6 estimates the three-year lagged effects.  
 
A typical pattern can be seen in the VRT effects on Age of Car. This risk determinant leads to 
a decrease in the loss ratios of 1995 (model 1) and 1996 (model 4) but this effect disappears 
soon after. A firm that introduced this risk determinant in 1995 as an innovator, indeed, 
suffered a significant increase in the loss ratio in 1998 - only two years after. A similar pattern 
can be seen for the Mileage variable in 1998. 
 
                                                 
24 OLS-estimation; significant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, ** and ***; t-values in parentheses. 
25 Hoa: null hypothesis could be rejected, Hona: null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses. 
26 Data set ‘motor vehicle insurance market’; estimated with EViews 4.0.    20
The general picture that emerges is that the efficiency effects of new risk classifications in 
Germany in the mid 1990s were short-term and purely selective. Firms who introduced valid 
risk determinants as first movers were able to decrease their loss ratio (increase profitability) 
and make others (second movers) pay in form of higher loss ratios (decreasing profitability). 
This ‘fishing for good risks’ did however not lead to a lasting economic benefit for the 
inventors. After a maximum of two years the profitability enhancing effect reversed: loss 
ratios went up again. 
 
5. The Effects of New Risk Characteristics on Insurance Premiums and Traffic Safety 
 
The key efficiency reason for risk classification is an expected decline in the average 
insurance premium due to an improved structure of total coverage (as explained in section 
two). Firm-specific variations of the loss ratio cannot fully capture this social benefit because 
they only measure the benefit to individual producers. We therefore look into the effect of 
new risk classifications on the market price for motor insurance coverage. Figure 3 compares 
the trend of insurance premiums to the general trend in consumer prices following de-
regulation of tariffs. Data is taken from the GDV statistics (GDV, 2003) and the Statistical 
Yearbook of Germany. 
    21
Figure 3: Premium Effects of Risk Classification 
 
Sources: GDV (2003), StatBA (2003) 
The market price of TPMI insurance coverage (solid line) exhibits a significant decline 
following the de-regulation of tariffs in the period 1995 to 1997 but approaches the general 
price trend (dotted line) in a massive price hike since 1998. The social benefit of risk 
classification again shows to be temporary, similar to the effects on firm profitability. The 
joint evidence of firm and market effects is that the liberalisation of TPMI enabled short-term 
economic gains for innovative firms but did not increase the overall efficiency of contracting 
or improving the general structure of coverage. This can be partly explained by the binding 
system of mandatory coverage in Germany (see section two). 
 
In section two we have demonstrated that a set of unclassified, pooled fair premiums (π) 
translates into inefficient incentives to take care under a BMS-type of experience rating. Risk 
classification may therefore improve the care taken by drivers. This effect also accrues in a 
compulsory coverage scheme of insurance. We therefore tested the validity of new risk 
characteristics by looking into the effects on traffic safety. Since care of different types of 


















Premium General Prices   22
the average damage per accident) as a proxy variable. The total damage indicates increased 
efficiency of care if we assume that the marginal costs to take care, are lower for high-risk 
types than for low-risk-types
27. We expected overall more care and less total damage as a 
result of applying valid new risk characteristics. 
 































































Source: GDV statistics 2002 
 
The trend of total damages depicted in Figure 4 disappoints this hope. In the five-year period 
following de-regulation (1994-1999) we see an increase in total damages. The amount of total 
damage (adjusted for inflation) approaches the pre-liberalisation level only in the past few 
years. The increase of damages in this period contrasts a long-term trend of decreasing 
damages since the 1960s (not pictured). It coincides with a wave of new motorisation in East 
Germany after re-unification. To control this influence, we also looked into the aggregate 
average loss ratio, ie the sum of losses over the sum of premiums in the market. The 
aggregate average loss ratio, however,  shows a very similar trend. It climbs in the period 
after de-regulation from 95 per-cent in 1993 to 110 per-cent in 1999 and approaches the pre-
liberalisation level in 2001. In summary, there is no indication that risk classification did help 
contain moral hazard and increase traffic safety – very much in line with our earlier findings. 
This lacking response of drivers to risk classification cannot be attributed to the system of 
compulsory insurance. The reasons here could either be ill-taken risk determinants or a failure 
to correctly translate risk-based premiums into driver incentives. An ‘incentive failure’ of this 
sort arises, for instance, if premium payers and drivers fall into two – as is typically the case 
for a family of firm run cars in a unitary system of owner insurance. Such legally stipulated 
systems of insurance ownership, which we find in Germany and many European countries, 
                                                 
27  If the marginal cost to take care are lower for high-risk types than for low-risk-types, increased care by high-
risks types is ceteris paribus: socially more beneficial than decreased care of low-risks.     23
may dilute the traffic safety effects of risk classification as we explain in the subsequent 
chapter. 
 
6. Demerit Points: a missed risk characteristic? 
 
Given the disappointing showing of the new risk characteristics with regard to traffic safety, 
we looked into the efficacy of applying a so far not used ‘behavioural’ risk determinant: 
demerit points. Demerit points are weights for individual traffic violations recorded at the 
Federal Transport Authority (FTA) in Flensburg/ Germany. Demerit points systems (DPS) are 
widely used in Canada to calculate premium surcharges or premium rebates for periods of 
legal obedience. The OECD has since long encouraged member nations to apply similar 
schemes, (DPS), in insurance rating as an incentive for safe driving behaviour (OECD 1990, 
59-63). Indeed, there is ample evidence from Canada (Hauer 1991, Smiley 1990, Chen 1995) 
and from Australia (Diamontopolou et al 1997) that prior traffic violations successfully select 
good and bad drivers. Specifically they help to identify a group of notoriously bad drivers 
with a many times greater than average accident risk. 
 
A recent study of the German FTA supports these findings. Schade and Heinzelmann (2003) 
estimate accident probabilities based on the observation of individual variables, including the 
number of prior traffic violations. The estimation was done with aggregated cross-sectional 
and longitudinal data of the FTA. Based on the estimated accident probabilities the authors 
calculate the odds of different subgroups of drivers and compare these values with the odds of 
other subgroups. The resulting odds ratios are presented in table 6. 
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Table 6: Traffic Violations as Accident Predictor 
 
        
  Sex  Other  Persons with violations in t, t-1, ...   
  Age  no violations  1 violation  2-3 violations >3 violations   
  Male   
  18 – 25   4,8 10,4  17,8  24,7   
  26 – 30  2,3 5,1 8,7  12,1   
  31 – 40  1,9 4,1 6,9 9,6   
  41 – 60  1,7 3,8 6,4 8,9   
  > 60   1,6 3,4 5,9 8,1   
 Female   
  18 – 25   2,8 6,1  10,3  14,3   
  26 – 30   1,4 3  5  7   
  31 – 40   1,1 2,4  4  5,6   
  41 – 60   1*            2,2  3,7  5,1   
  > 60   0,9 2 3,4  4,7   
        
 
Source: Adapted from Schade and Heinzelmann (2004) 
The group of ladies aged 41-60 are defined as reference risk (1*). The accident probability of 
this group is estimated at 3.6 per mile, or 36 accidents on 10,000 insureds. Being younger 
increases this risk almost three times to ten per mile (Female, aged 18-25), while being young 
and male increases the risk almost five times to 17 per mile (Male, aged 18-25). Importantly, 
in all subgroups the risk increases significantly if prior traffic violations were observed. For 
individuals with more than one traffic violation (which can occur without suspension of the 
driver’s license if the violations are minor) the odds ratio may even increase up to 25 times 
the basic risk. 
Given these obvious risk differences between groups of drivers, we may ask why this risk 
factor had not been selected in the German market after de-regulation. The reasons are again 
institutional. This becomes apparent if we compare the key characteristics of the system of 
insurance in Canada to TPMI in Germany. 
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The Canadian DPS is part of a basic compulsory insurance that the federal states of Canada 
provide through a public monopoly insurer or, in some states, through private insurers that are 
fully regulated by public authorities. Moreover, the DPS is embedded into a dual system of 
driver and owner insurance. The concrete legal setting varies between the states. In Manitoba, 
for instance, drivers must be insured against all at-fault accidents. When renewing the driving 
license they have to take out state-owned basic insurance. Demerit points are used at this 
occasion to calculate a risk-based insurance rate. 
 
Comparing this to the German TPMI, we find a much more competitive TPMI market and, 
more importantly, a unitary system of owner insurance. Driver’s in Germany are not legally 
accountable for accidents except for gross negligence where insurance is also denied. 
Applying a Canadian-style DPS within this system of unitary owner’s insurance would make 
the owner fully responsible for the driving of any user of his car. It would thus shift the 
principal-agent problem from the level of insurer and insureds to the level of owner and 
driver. This seems unreasonable (if both are not having the same identity) and is mentioned as 
a key obstacle to this scheme by the German insurance association (Ewers et al, 2004). The 
switching cost, to a dual system of driver’s and owner’s insurance, on the other hand, would 
be substantial. It would require a system of dual accounting of accidents (for drivers and 
owners) at the FTA (Ewers et al, 2004). As a result, we find that institutional givens prohibit 




There are many good economic reasons for classifying insurance risks according to their type. 
It increases the efficiency of contracting, it improves the composition of insureds and it 
contains moral hazards. The benefits to society are less total damage, and a lower average 
price of insurance. These multiple benefits of risk classification are however conditional on 
the market structure. They can be expected in ‘normal’ markets. In markets with remnants of 
a long history of regulation such as mandatory third-party motor insurance in Germany, they 
can be missed. The effects of risk classification in such markets are mainly re-distributive and 
potentially wasteful. 
 
This paper studies the empirical effect of risk classification in the mandatory TPMI of 
Germany. It provides evidence that inefficient risk categories had been selected, while 
potentially efficient information was dismissed. We also find indications that the wave of risk 
classification in the 1990s did not improve the efficiency of contracting and the composition    26
of insureds. Efficiency effects at the firm level were generally short-term and highly selective. 
Only firms who introduced valid risk determinants as first movers were able to decrease their 
loss ratio at the expense of other firms which did not immediately follow this behavior. But 
even this effect was temporary: the loss ratios reversed after a maximum of only two years. 
These findings are supported by general trends in the insurance market. The average price of 
car insurance did only temporarily decline and increased sharply in the late 1990s. Traffic-
related damages did even increase in the aftermath of liberalisation. The disappointing 
showing of the new risk determinants can be partly explained by the existence of compulsory 
fixed coverage and other institutional restraints such as unitary owner insurance in this 
market.  
 
Our findings have implications for the recent policy debate in the EU. They should caution us 
against a fierce economic critique of the EU initiative for gender equality: the costs of 
applying a restriction to use sex as a risk characteristic seems small in mandatory insurance 
markets such as German TPMI. This will be different in completely de-regulated markets 
(outside Germany). Missing a further cost-benefit analysis of this risk factor it seems 
recommendable to limit the directive’s field of application to mandatory branches of 
insurance in Europe. 
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